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Abstract. A new solution of Fermi's paradox sketched by SF writer Karl Schroeder in his 
2002. novel Permanence is investigated. It is argued that this solution is tightly connected 
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The work of the Spirit of earth, as he weaves and draws his threads on the Loom 
of Time, is the temporal history of man as this manifests itself in the geneses and 
growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of human societies; and in all this 
welter of life and tempest of action we can hear the beat of an elemental rhythm 
whose variations we have learnt to know as challenge-and-response, 
withdrawal-and-return, rout-and-rally, apparentation-and-affiliation, schism-
and-palingenesia. This elemental rhythm is the alternating beat of Yin and Yang; 
and in listening to it we have recognized that, though strophe may be answered 
by antistrophe, victory by defeat, creation by destruction, birth by death, the 
movement that this rhythm beats out is neither the fluctuation of an indecisive 
battle nor the cycle of a treadmill. 
 
Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. I, Chapter III, (4) [1] 
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We use our intelligence to investigate the issue of hypothetical intelligences 
elsewhere in the Galaxy—so much is uncontroversial. Is it conceivable, however, 
that exactly this obvious and unavoidable selection effect causes systematic errors 
in our judgment on the perennial problem summarized in the famous Fermi’s 
question: Where is Everybody? This is not to indicate—as many SETI-detractors have 
indeed done—that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence is misconceived or 
founded on false premises; instead, we ask a deeper question about the 
intelligibility of our very concept of intelligence. Without it, we are left in the 
strange position of the ancient Chinese philosopher who concluded that, since 
nobody knows what a unicorn really is, he might have already seen a unicorn 
without noticing it. In this essay, we shall briefly investigate such a proposal in the 
modern astrobiological context. 
Fermi’s question has recently become more pertinent than ever. For the first 
time in the millennia-long history of speculation on extraterrestrial life, in the last 
couple of years we got the numerical hold on the age distribution of possible life-
bearing sites in the Galaxy. Seminal results of Lineweaver and his collaborators 
[2,3] show that Earth-like planets began forming in the Milky Way about 9.3 Gyr 
ago, while their average age is 6.4 ± 0.9 Gyr. This is significantly larger than the age 
of Earth (measured to be 4.56 ± 0.01 Gyr [4]), indicating that the difference between 
evolutionary ages of other biospheres in the Galaxy and ours should—on the 
Copernican assumption of our average location and properties—be more than a 
billion years. It becomes then especially hard to answer the question why we do 
not perceive any manifestations of Galactic supercivilizations, more than a billion 
years older and unimaginably more advanced than we are. A billion years ago, 
very simple organisms, like bacteria and acritarchs, were the only inhabitants of 
our planet; shouldn't we be like them to an average extraterrestrial intelligent 
community in the Milky Way? What about those which are even more advanced 
than the average? What about the first Galactic civilization? It is becoming 
increasingly difficult to assert that conditions on Earth, terrestrial life and 
intelligence are typical, or average, in the Galactic context. 
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One would think that at a time when books with titles such as Fifty Solutions 
to Fermi's paradox [5,6] are written and widely read, it seems nearly impossible to 
invent a new solution to the old puzzle of the apparent absence of extraterrestrial 
intelligences in our past light cone. However this is exactly something which Karl 
Schroeder does in his brilliant SF novel Permanence [7]. This is a novel solution in 
both senses of the word—it blends discoursive philosophical and scientific 
thinking, with a poetic expression appropriate for its format, and it has not been 
seriously analysed in the astrobiological research literature so far. It is not entirely 
surprising that a serious scientific hypothesis is formulated, in a qualitative 
manner, in the recreational context of a piece of SF art; astrobiology is perhaps 
uniquely positioned to exert such influence upon human minds of various bents. 
After all, much of the scientific interest in questions of life beyond Earth in the XX 
century was generated by works such as Herbert G. Wells' War of the Worlds, Sir 
Arthur Clarke's 2001: Space Odyssey, or Sir Fred Hoyle's The Black Cloud. 
And this is not the only reason to devote the present essay to analysis of this 
solution. As we shall see, this solution may point in the direction of a 
multidisciplinary synthesis—one which has both the virtue of being connected 
with what we know from terrestrial evolutionary biology and which could yield 
testable scientific hypotheses. The aim of this paper—it cannot be 
overemphasized—is not to selectively promote Schroeder’s scenario as the solution 
of Fermi’s paradox; in our present state of ignorance that would be a disservice to 
serious astrobiological endeavor. (This can be said without reference to inherent 
flaws which, in the opinion of the present author, are clearly visible in Schroeder’s 
scenario.) However, the ideas exposed in Permanence certainly deserve a serious 
scrutiny as well as wider discussion in the rapidly expanding realm of astrobiology 
and SETI studies—and it is along these lines that the present essay finds its raison 
d’être. 
  
* * * 
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The plot of Schroeder's novel revolves around the dichotomy between so-
called lit worlds (i.e. those surrounding Sun-like stars) and the worlds of the 
“Cycler Compact”, surrounding brown dwarfs. Since the average distance between 
brown dwarfs is most probably by a factor of a few smaller than the average 
interstellar distance, it makes sense for the Cycler worlds to communicate via slow 
interstellar vessels (“cyclers”), which cruise along a preset path, using the Galactic 
magnetic field to maneuver. Usage of cyclers creates a specific culture (of “halo 
worlders”), which is beautifully described by Schroeder.  
Permanence begins auspiciously enough. We join the protagonist, Rue 
Cassels on the space station that is her home. It is located near a brown dwarf star 
which belongs to the Cycler Compact. With the invention of an FTL drive that only 
works around bright or "lit" stars, the economy based on these ships fades away. 
All this is important background of the story, but for now Rue is escaping the 
station and her abusive brother with a ship. On the way to a planet around the 
dwarf, she lays claim to something. The action then flashes forward to the planet 
around the dwarf star where Rue meets her cousin. Soon the book jumps again to 
join a distinguished astrobiologist, Dr. Herat, his companion, Michael Bequith, and 
some military-types who study alien civilizations and their remains. They join up 
with Rue and her companions, and a story finally begins to form centered on the 
basic “big dumb object”. There are a few more jumps in the story, but the latter 
two-thirds of the book maintain a reasonable narrative coherence. 
All of the classical elements of great science fiction are here—from action 
and adventure to fading and fallen civilizations, from Galactic politics and intrigue 
to outright war and rebellion. What we are interested here, however, is the 
underlying astrobiological premise, which contains the best elaboration so far of an 
original solution to Fermi’s paradox. There are few other books of fiction so 
thoroughly infused with the astrobiological topics and issues. Even the fortuitous 
or vaguely symbolic subjects, like the title of Part One—“Ediacara”—have 
astrobiological significance.1 
                                                 
1 Ediacaran fauna—itself named after Ediacaran Hills in the outback of Southwestern Australia—
presented the last (Vendian) phase of the Precambrian period. Recent radiometric studies fixed 
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Schroeder's astrobiologists of the future endorse part of the “rare Earth” 
paradigm of Ward and Brownlee [9], notably the ubiquity of simple life: 
 
Enough infrared leaked out of Erythrion to heat the surface of Treya to 
livable temperature, and tidal and induction heating kept it volcanically 
active. But without a sun, life had never developed here—or rather it had 
developed and died out a number of times... (p. 27)  
 
However, as we shall see, Schroeder radically departs from the “rare Earth” 
paradigm, and his solution is, in a sense, polemic with Ward and Brownlee.   
 
* * * 
 
Schroeder starts from the physical background assumed by most 
researchers, and the one in which Fermi's paradox is most sharply manifested: his 
Galaxy is continuously habitable for most of its history, or at least for periods of 
time much longer than the timescale for the rise of a starfaring technological 
species.2 Why, then, astrobiological investigations of several centuries have not 
revealed advanced technological species similar to humans? It is crucial to keep in 
mind that this is not just a fictional question in a fictional scenario; it is our present 
dilemma in SETI studies when faced with Fermi's paradox, only scaled up a bit. 
Schroeder hopes that this scaling, this powerful magnification lense, will give us a 
glimpse of the solution. In order to achieve this, he needs to delineate two 
mutually exclusive philosophies underpinning our understanding of the role of 
intelligence in the universe.  
                                                                                                                                                     
their first appearance at 565 million years before the present, and they have lasted till the Cambrian 
boundary, about 543 million years ago. They are now thought to represent transitional 
intermediates to the Cambrian animals—a kind of fuse on the famous Cambrian Explosion. For 
more details see, e.g., [8]. 
2 E.g., Schroeder’s civilization of Dis which plays a crucial role in humans’ understanding is about 3 
billion years old.  
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Schroeder first briefly sketches what he calls providential view of 
astrobiology. It  seems to be prominent today in the actual world of astrobiological 
and SETI researchers: 
 
The truth is that we are intelligent animals, but animals just the same, 
subject to the inescapable laws of our evolution. Our first theories about 
alien intelligence were providential: we believed with Teilhard de 
Chardin, that consciousness is a basic characteristic of complex thinking 
entities. When we developed the FTL drive, we burst into the galaxy in 
search for beings more “evolved” than ourselves, in the belief that a 
universal Reason would unite us with other species at the same level. (p. 
108) 
 
This view has been criticized by a number of influential critics in both scientific 
and literary domains, including Ernst Mayr, George G. Simpson, John Barrow and 
Frank Tipler, Stanislaw Lem, Ronald Bracewell, Sir Arthur Clarke, Strugatsky 
brothers, Zoran Živković, and others, though it is still predominant in the SETI 
field.3  
But what should such a view be contrasted with? Schroeder offers a strong 
alternative, which he does not dub, but which we can, for reasons to be shortly 
described, call adaptationist: 
 
What we found instead was that even though a species might remain 
starfaring for millions of years, consciousness does not seem to be 
required for toolmaking. In fact, consciousness appears to be a phase. No 
                                                 
3 This is somewhat ironical, since most of actual SETI researchers are agnostic, at least from an 
external perspective, and would be surprised to find their views associated with Teilhard de 
Chardin, who in scientific circles earned—perhaps undeservedly—a reputation of being a quasi-
scientist and mystic. In general, religious views are nowadays usually associated with opposition to 
SETI and contact-scepticism (a prominent example is Frank Tipler; see [10,11]). Even more to the 
point, Teilhard himself did not believe in extraterrestrial intelligent life (at least until the last phase 
of his thinking, in 1950s, when he seemingly revised some tenets of his system); in The Phenomenon 
of Man he wrote that evolution of intelligence elsewhere has a “probability too remote to be worth 
dwelling on” [12]. However, on a deeper level, Schroeder's characterization is correct. As succinctly 
put in Wildiers' foreword to the book of Hague [13]: “As a student of the phenomenon of man, 
Teilhard de Chardin constantly refused to see in reflective consciousness a mere epiphenomenon, a 
mere accident thrown up by nature, unrelated to the underlying structure of our universe.” (p. 7) 
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species we have studied has retained what we could call self-awareness 
for its entire history. Certainly none has evolved into some state above 
consciousness. (p. 108) 
 
This is the crux of the problem (for the astrobiologist protagonists of the novel;  
solution for us, willing to resolve Fermi's paradox): our estimates and expectations 
of the phenomenon of intelligence—which is, above all, a biological 
phenomenon—are wrong. Intelligence is significant only insofar as it offers an 
evolutionary advantage, a meaningful response to the selective pressure of the 
fluctuating environment. Only so far, and no further is the “selfish gene” [14] 
willing to carry that piece of luggage.  
 This approach to explanation in biology is known as adaptationism; its 
major proponents being distinguished biologists such as Richard Dawkins and 
John Maynard-Smith, as well as contemporary philosophers such as Daniel 
Dennett or Eliot Sobber. Adaptation is a trait that has been selected for by natural 
selection. Adaptationist hypothesis can be conventionally defined as a statement 
that asserts that a given trait in a population is an adaptation. In other words, 
natural selection is the major (if not the sole) cause of presence and persistence of 
traits in a given population. The definition of Sober in his influential book [15] goes 
as follows: 
 
Adaptationism: Most phenotypic traits in most populations can be 
explained by a model in which selection is described and nonselective 
processes are ignored. (p. 122) 
 
Examples of adaptationist explanations abound. Camouflage colors of birds and 
insects, Eskimo faces, horns of Ontophagus acuminatus, and myriads of other 
observed properties of living beings are interpreted as giving their carriers an 
advantage in the endless mill of natural selection. Their genes are more likely to 
propagate along the thousands of generations of natural history. The most extreme 
version of adaptationism is sometimes called gene-centrism and is expounded by 
Richard Dawkins, and neatly encapsulated in the title of his best-selling book The 
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Selfish Gene [14]: genes are using (in a sufficiently impersonal sense of the word, see 
Ref. 16) organisms to propagate its own copies as efficiently as possible in time. It 
may be of historical interest that adaptationism is usually traced back to Alfred R. 
Wallace, one of the two great biological revolutionaries, who was also one of the 
forefathers of modern astrobiology with his intriguing and remarkably prescient 
1903 book Man's Place in the Universe [17].4 
 This view is the scientific foundation of Schroeder’s solution to Fermi’s 
paradox. Intelligence is an adaptive trait, like any other. Adaptive traits are bound 
to disappear once the environment changes sufficiently for any selective advantage 
which existed previously to disappear. In the long run, the intelligence is bound to 
disappear, as its selective advantage is temporally limited by ever-changing 
physical and ecological conditions.  
 
Look at crocodiles. Humans might move into their environment—
underwater in swamps. We might devise all kinds of sophisticated 
devices to help us live there, or artificially keep the swamp drained. But 
do you really think that, over thousands or millions of years, there won't 
be political uprisings? System failures? Religious wars? Mad bombers? 
The instant something perturbs the social systems that's needed to 
support the technology, the crocodiles will take over again, because all 
they have to do to survive is swim and eat. 
 
Schroeder's protagonist continues: 
 
It's the same with consciousness. We know now that it evolves to enable 
a species to deal with unforeseen situations. By definition, anything 
we've mastered becomes instinctive. Walking is not something we have 
to consciously think about, right? Well, what about physics, chemistry, 
social engineering? If we have to think about them, we haven't mastered 
them—they are still troublesome to us. A species that succeeds in really 
                                                 
4 Ironically enough, Wallace also (in)famously insisted—to Darwin’s dismay—that human mind 
shows so many nonadaptive features, like the music appreciation, abstract mathematics or spiritual 
communication, that it is a sure sign of an intervention by higher intelligence. See, e.g. [18]. 
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mastering something like physics has no more need to be conscious of it. 
Quantum mechanics becomes an instinct, the way ballistics already is for 
us. Originally, we must have had to put a lot of thought into throwing 
things like rocks or spears. We eventually evolved to be able to throw 
without thinking—and that is a sign of things to come. Some day, we'll 
become... able to maintain a technological infrastructure without needing 
to think about it. Without need to think, at all... 
 
The idea that intelligence might one day cease to be useful to its possessors has 
been present in SF and popular culture for a long time, at least as a sort of black 
humor joke. We shall consider some of the similar ideas below. However, nobody 
has gone in that direction so far and so consequently as Schroeder. He envisions an 
incredibly advanced (by human standards) culture facing this frightening 
evolutionary impasse: 
 
The inhabitants of Dis studied previous starfaring species. The records 
are hard to decipher, but I found evidence that all previous galactic 
civilizations had succumbed to the same internal contradictions. The Dis-
builders tried to avoid their fate, but over the ages they were replaced on 
all their worlds by fitter offspring. These descendents had no need for 
tools, for culture, for historical records. They and their environment were 
one. The conscious, spacefaring species could always come back and take 
over easily from them. But given enough time... and time always passes... 
the same end result would occur. They would be replaced again. And so 
they saw that their very strength, the highest attainments they as a 
species had achieved, contained the seeds of their downfall. 
 
 10
 
Figure 1. A schematic rise and fall of technological civilizations in the Galaxy according to 
Schroeder's picture. Key concept is adaptation. 
 
This chain of events is schematically shown in Figure 1. An intelligent species can 
last long in the state of direct adaptation to their environment on the home planet 
(local)—several hundred thousand years in the case of homo sapiens sapiens. A 
rather fast transition from direct to technological adaptation corresponds to 
building of a technical civilization, this crucial ingredient of all SETI studies. But 
the stage of technological adaptation, distributed all over the various planets, is 
inherently less stable. In a long run, it will tend to pass into a state of fragmented 
habitats reverting to direct biological adaptation (“crocodiles returning”). The 
second transition is much slower and might be occassionally interrupted or 
arrested; yet, the general trend toward return to direct adaptation is inescapable. 
This bifurcation is, in this view, tantamount to extinction of the original intelligent 
species, and its remains are gradually submerged into the general astrobiological 
“noise” of the Galaxy. Sic transit gloria mundi. The transient nature of the phase of 
technological adaptation constitutes the bulk of the “Great Filter” explaining the 
silentium universi [19,20].  
There is another perspective in which we can approach the same issue. 
What can we, from our standpoint of predominant ignorance, conclude about 
other Galactic intelligent species? It'd be all too easy for us to unthinkingly assume 
that all intelligent life is carbon-based, metabolizes using oxidation, and eats pizza, 
just because folks around here do. But how to escape this unthinking parochialism 
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without falling into some sort of skepticism? Schroeder proceeds in a way which 
will look familiar to both physicists and biologists: by assuming that all these 
observed phenomenological aspects of intelligent life are in the final analysis 
consequences of a deeper underlying principle, which is adaptationism. The 
diversity of Earth's biosphere is astonishing; and yet, even the most ardent 
ecologist and conservationist would hardly argue that it is but an infinitesimal 
fraction of possible diversity, of the “Library of Mendel”5, which would contain all 
possible genotypes—even if we retain the same biochemical basis of life. (An even 
greater variety certainly becomes available if we allow for different biochemistries 
at various locales all over the Galaxy.) Thus, our eating pizza would be—in the 
more extreme adaptationist variants, particularly in evolutionary psychology—an 
external manifestation of the underlying molecular striving for accommodation to 
our particular environment. An incredibly advanced alien astrobiologist could, in 
principle, infer the existence of pizza-eating from sufficiently detailed 
understanding of the terrestrial physical and chemical environment. In the same 
manner, the wide spectrum of diverse Galactic habitats would produce different 
spectrum of adaptive behaviors. But the overarching logic of the adaptive 
development necessarily contains a boundary: one can be perfectly adapted to 
one's environment—but certainly not more adapted than that. And, Schroeder 
suggests, the perfect adaptation in the numerically by far predominant locales does 
not include tool-making abilities or star-faring capacities.6   
Schroeder suggests that the ultimate Copernican revolution should bring 
forth the view that intelligence is not only common, on the average, but that it is in 
fact unimportant. It makes as much impact on the overall unfolding of cosmic 
events in the long run as does a blue color on wings of a particular species of 
terrestrial butterflies. To ask for anything grander, deeper, more spiritually 
profound, or elevated, is just a manifestation of our incurable “psychocentrism”. 
                                                 
5 See Dennett, Ref. 16. 
6 Astrobiology seems to be particularly suitable grounds for exercising adaptationism, since it by 
definition includes most varied environmental conditions and selective pressures possible. On the 
other hand, this will make the explanatory task much more difficult and trap-ladden. As Griffiths 
[21] wrote: “The adaptationist assumes that almost all forms are developmentally possible, so 
learning that the actual form is possible does not explain the contrast between this form and the 
adjacent forms.” 
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And, in the final analysis, psychocentrism just steps in shoes of “classical” 
anthropocentrism, either in its old-fashioned teleological or modern (e.g., “rare 
Earth”) form.  
This is nicely encapsulated in an ancient cartoon by Henry de la Beche 
(under the wonderful title “AWFUL CHANGES”) shown in Figure 2, and widely 
popularized by Stephen Jay Gould in his Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle [22]. 
Resurrected ichthyosauri of the far future of the Earth muse over human fossil 
remnants, concluding that this creature could not be well adapted to its 
environment. Abstract for the moment the obvious fact that ichthyosauri would 
have needed intelligence and even tool-making in order to give lectures on 
paleontology; this is just the superficial problem of the situation. The deeper 
issue—and one which cuts to the core of the adaptationist approach to Fermi’s 
paradox—is that those terrifying sea reptiles from Mesozoic need not know 
anything about intelligence or pizza-eating or spaceship construction whatsoever; 
taken to the adaptationist extreme (often ridiculed by Gould himself), they could 
even conclude that the fact that humans went extinct is the very proof of their 
inability to cope—of their poor adaptive qualities, that is. This reasoning does 
possess an element of circularity, but as Raup laments [23,24], this seems to be the 
case with most of our accounts of extinction of earlier species! With exception of 
the dinosaurs and the small subset of other species which perished, we rather 
confidently state, in sudden catastrophes having nothing do to with their 
adaptation levels, our view of most of the extinctions (especially those 
“background” ones, constituting a reference point for defining “mass extinction 
episodes”) is characterized by the same circularity: in accordance with the 
Darwinian view, we are forced to conclude that they were poorly adapted to their 
environment and thus became extinct. Nothing is said about intelligence or 
capacity for pizza-eating, as well as of any other particular trait.  
Why none of the species have evolved to a state above consciousness, 
something like much speculated “transcedence” figuring (usually clumsily) in so 
many other SF works? The answer in the context of the adaptationist paradigm is 
clear: because there is no environmental feature which would require anything 
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above the consciousness. Even the consciousness itself is useful only in the short 
run!  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A wonderful 1830 cartoon by Henry de la Beche, resuscitated by Stephen Jay 
Gould in Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle [22]; see the historical discussion of Rudwick [30]. A 
powerful predator like ichthyosaurus—revived in far future, according to a bizarre 
speculation of Charles Lyell which is satirized here—finds hard to conceive that long-ago 
extinct humans had ever been well-adapted to their environment.   
 
Simplified variations or hints on the same theme have appeared from time 
to time in both scientific and popular literature. Interestingly enough, both 
Schroeder (private communication) and Dennett [16] find a strong inspiration for 
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their adaptationist views in Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. The very concept of 
“permanence” has important similarities with Nietzschean “eternal return of the 
same”. While this topic is certainly too complex to be investigated within the scope 
of the present essay, we shall briefly return later to another similarity between 
Schroeder’s and Nietzsche’s worlds – their overarching and unavoidable nihilism.   
The picture of bifurcation of species due to adaptation (although intentional 
in this case) is the major motiff of the classic The Seedling Stars by James Blish [25]. 
However, the darker aspect of the situation in which the limits of knowledge and 
intelligence are reached is only rarely shown in the SF discourse. Such fate befells 
the flabbergastingly old and advanced civilization of Transmuters in Greg Egan's 
Diaspora: 
 
'Then why did they stop?' 
 'Because there was nothing more to do. ... They'd seen everything 
they wanted to see in the outside world – they'd risen through at least six 
universes – and then they'd spent two hundred trillion clock ticks 
thinking about it. Building abstract scapes, making art, reviewing their 
history... We'll never decipher it; we'll never know for sure what went 
on. But we don't need to. Do you want to ransack the data, hunting for 
secrets? Do you want to rob their graves?' (Ref. 26, p. 358) 
 
A suggestion along these lines has been made by the Russian author Vladimir 
Khlumov in 1987 [27] in a short story; it is somewhat elaborated in a discoursive 
form by the distinguished astrophysicist Vladimir Lipunov [28]. Khlumov and 
Lipunov suggest that there is nothing inherent in the concept of intelligence which 
can be manifested without reference to the empirical content of the world. Thus, if 
the amount of information describing this empirical content in its entirety is finite, 
the intelligence is finite as well. What happens when this amount of information is 
processed? Intelligence ends as well, reply Klimov and Lipunov. When every 
problem is solved, when no unanswered question arises, when no new theory is 
ever necessary for explanation of any phenomenon, it seems natural enough to 
suppose that the mill of intelligence grinds to a halt. Is the low-complexity of the 
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Universe (and the suggestion often enjoyed in some circles of theoretical physicists 
that the “Theory of Everything” is at hand) the reason why we do not perceive 
advanced extraterrestrials? 
Perhaps the most pertinent scientific account pointing in this direction is a 
brief paper given by David M. Raup, one of the leading paleontologists of XX 
century, at 38th International Astronautical Congress at Brighton, UK in 1987, 
under the indicative title Unconscious intelligence in the universe [29]. Raup has been, 
for much of his illustrious career, one of the major contributors to our 
understanding of the great episodes of mass extinctions of species in Earth's past, 
as well as a champion of the extraterrestrial causes for at least some of those (e.g. 
[23,24]), thus exemplifying a multidisciplinary character of the astrobiological 
enterprise. In this particular contribution, he speculates that animals on other 
planets may have evolved, by natural selection, the ability to communicate by 
radio waves. Our own SETI projects are still mostly radio-based. Radio 
communication in such non-intelligent organisms as proposed by Raup would 
persist much longer than radio communication developed by intelligent beings, 
which would be ephemeral due to cultural changes. Strategies for SETI should take 
the possibility of such radio communication into account.  
The link between Raup's and Schroeder's scenario becomes clear when we 
consider the adaptationist grounding of both. If we recognize that something we 
parochially regard as the summit of intentional intelligent tool-making—radio 
communication, that is—can evolve by direct adaptation, which other feature of 
technological civilization is safe from emulation by Nature? Raup emphasizes the 
long-term aspect of the situation, and that the adaptive radio sources can be 
predominant in the total set of radio sources. Similarly, in Schroeder's picture, the 
number of Galactic habitats with direct adaptation (either before or after the 
technological phase) is much greater than the current number of sites of 
technological civilization.  
It is far beyond the scope of this essay to even remotely discuss pros and 
cons of adaptationist doctrine as such. It is enough to be aware of the cloud of 
polemic and debate it is surrounded with for almost a century and a half since its 
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inception by Darwin (or, more to the point, Wallace). It is to be assumed that the 
debate will continue in the future, and quite possibly will remain with us when 
first sites of extraterrestrial life are found. Keep in mind that this adaptationist 
solution is not—at least on the human timescales!—what Dennett rightly 
condemns as “greedy” adaptationism. It does not assume (with, for instance, 
Skinner’s behaviorism) that culture and its all achievements, fine art, letters, etc. 
are just highly specialized adaptations and/or can be determined by biological 
mechanisms.7 This strong thesis (or caricature) is unnecessary to begin with; the 
solution to Fermi’s paradox simply requires that in the long run culture is 
irrelevant to the history of species as a whole. The issue of relevancy is entirely 
separable from the issue of biological (or other) determinism. This division perhaps 
does not remove our emotional revulsion at such reductionist approach, but blunts 
criticisms by anti-adaptationists. In fact, Schroeder offers many examples that the 
culture is in fact not determined by “genetic fate” in store for a species; for 
instance, Dr. Herat’s report which explains this fate continues: 
  
The Panspermia Institute was formed out of the disappointment of this 
discovery. We sought to uncover the conditions that give rise to 
sentience; if we could not find aliens like ourselves, perhaps we could 
guide candidate species into our mode of experience. (p. 108) 
 
This external (in Plato's sense) teleological engineering of candidate species would 
be antithetical to the default assumption of adaptationism. Herein, parenthetically, 
lies one of the weaknesses of Schroeder's solution, since there is no proof—or 
indeed a clear counterargument—that a chain of contingent intentional strategies 
for preventing adaptationist devolution could not extend over an arbitrarily long 
time in a history of advanced civilization. In other words, things certainly can and 
will go wrong at many locations over a sufficient period of time, but one could 
easily imagine planning and building of “concentric rings” of safety mechanisms, 
each activated after all previous have failed. Each mechanism individually can and 
                                                 
7 Another instance of such greediness is the (in)famous example of Aztec ritual cannibalism rightly 
mocked by Gould and Lewontin in the Spandrels paper [31].  
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will eventually fail, but there seems to be no clear reason why the entire system 
could not be simply vast enough and continuously assembled over time in order to 
counter the diverging trends of isolation and devolution.  
Another important feature of Schroeder's solution is that, contrary to what 
astrobiologists and SETI researchers usually assume, the speed of evolution in a 
given locale is unimportant for determination of the number and age of accessible 
alien civilizations. It has been usually assumed that fast evolution (similar to the 
techno-evolution we perceive on Earth in last several centuries) will cause 
civilizations to evolve up the ladder of Kardashev types: from Type I (more or less 
similar to present-day human) to Type II (capable of building a Dyson sphere and 
marshalling all resources of its planetary system) to Type III (pan-galactic 
civilization spanning many planetary systems and managing resources on the 
galactic scale). Schroeder dispells this illusion: in his picture, faster the evolution, 
faster is the devolution of a species into the non-conscious state. Standing next to 
an alien artifact, a protagonist muses (p. 217):  
 
Maybe this really was just a thing, magnesium alloy and aerogel filling, 
no more or less significant than any rock. It had been created by blind 
evolutionary fate, as had he; he wasn't going anywhere but where his 
genes led him; nor was the human race going anywhere. Herat had 
proven that—they were at the top of the evolutionary arc, with nowhere 
to go but down. So all this investigation was futile. You could already see 
the seeds of decay... 
 
(Schroeder parenthetically answers another pertinent question which has probably 
puzzled more than one SF writer—is there a credible threat to survival of an 
advanced interstellar society spanning many planetary systems? Contrary to the 
juvenile naive picture of grand cosmic catastrophes, the true threat lurks deep 
within the very essence of intelligent beings. As the Bard wrote: The fault, dear 
Brutus, is not in our stars // But in ourselves, that we are underlings.) 
 What adaptationism fails to explain on Earth, it will fail to explain in the 
Milky Way. Perhaps the foremost problem with the adaptationist doctrine as 
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currently presented by the evolutionary orthodoxy is its failure to be useful in 
cases of brief and sudden episodes in the history of life known as the mass 
extinctions. In the words of Raup's title [23], in such times “luck” is more 
important than “genes”. In our (highly incomplete) fossil record, “Big Five” mass 
extinction episodes stand as the most remarkable features, after the Cambrian 
Explosion, of the history of life. We cannot, of course, delve into this huge topic 
here in detail, but it is important to notice that the general assumption that mass 
extinctions have decidedly impacted the vector of evolutionary progress on Earth 
is probable to hold in the wider astrobiological context of the Milky Way either. Of 
course, the global regulation mechanism in the galactic case must be very different, 
but a hopeful candidate exists in shape of gamma-ray bursts (Ref. 32 and 
references therein). The true solution to Fermi’s paradox will be, one is tempted to 
suspect, the one which could strike a fine balance between the catastrophist and 
gradualist effects in the course of time—a sort of “punctuated equilibrium” [33] on 
the Galactic scale! 
 
* * * 
 
Finally, a word about our emotional reactions to this sort of solution might 
be in order. Schroeder's is a depressing hypothesis, in a sense even worse than the 
conventional “catastrophic” scenarios in which intelligence self-destructs with a 
boom. It is worse than self-destruction, since the latter at least pinpoints a peculiar 
feature of intelligence and its technological post-evolution; it subconsciously 
affirms the awesome power of intelligence, even if misused. But Schroeder gives 
no quarter here: there can be nothing peculiar about intelligence, at least nothing 
more peculiar or exceptional than the color of a butterfly's wings. Its physical 
power of creation or destruction is completely ephemeral and—ultimately—
irrelevant.  
It is difficult to avoid being revolted by Schroeder's suggestion. But this is 
also old news, since it is in the same manner that adaptationist explanations in 
other fields of biology and life sciences are often emotionally unpalatable and even 
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revolting. Disciplines such as sociobiology and evolutionary psychology have 
sprung out of application of the adaptationist reasoning to animal and human 
behavior. Their very existence sparks controversy to this day, but the controversy 
can be construed as a resistance of the same “psychocentrism” we grow 
accustomed to. Is the rejection not only of any value we may find in our lifeworks, 
but also the totality of the “civilization”, “culture”, and other similar memes we 
use to denote long-term values we hope to create on the literally cosmic scale a 
caricature or even a reductio of the adaptationist doctrine or just its logical and 
sober consequence? The future of our own species will answer this question, in 
action if not in discourse, but it will be answered at some point.   
All of this suggests a reinterpretation of Karl Schroeder's novel title as a 
monumental irony: while evolutionary change is ubiquitous in the universe, 
intelligence itself is anything but permanent. Its wakes and tides are marked 
feature of the Galaxy in the astrobiological context, but we shall have to adapt (no 
pun intended!) to the Heraclitean fact that only change is permanent.  
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